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The Expanding Ecology of a Hot Commodity: A Century of Changes in the New
Mexican Chile Pepper
by
William Carleton

ABSTRACT

Over the past century, the New Mexican chile pepper transformed from a
principally local and regional crop grown by many, small scale growers into an industrial
commodity on a global market. With this transformation, the ecology of the chile pepper
has shifted and expanded. The actors in this ecology- the growers, the research scientists,
the manufacturers of equipment, chemicals, and seeds, government legislatures, the
consumers, and even the genome of the chile itself- became increasingly global with little
or no ties to the local watersheds, ecosystems, and communities within the state. Driving
this ecological expansion has been a close public-private collaboration between the
state‟s land-grant institution, NMSU, and private industry.
This paper begins with an examination of Dr. Fabian Garcia, NMSU‟s first chile
breeder. Garcia made significant efforts to disseminate his research to large and small
farmers throughout the state. Yet even during Garcia‟s tenure, the seeds of a major
agricultural and ecological shift in the state were beginning to sprout. This shift, part of
the larger Green Revolution transforming industrial agriculture throughout the nation and
the world, made satisfying the needs and goals of both small farmer and large commodity
producer increasingly difficult. By the 1970s, the pepper had become a mild, uniform,
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and high-tech commodity that would no longer be grown primarily by small scale New
Mexican farmers mainly for New Mexicans.
In the years after NAFTA, when the industry began to face decline and increasing
global competition, the chile‟s ecology both expanded into new realms of corporate
control, but also contracted. As large producers vertically integrated moved their
operations across national borders, jobs for Mexican workers in New Mexican chile
fields became scarcer, and smaller New Mexican growers were outcompeted by larger
ones. All the while, industrial monocultures and the new potential for lawsuits to
discourage seed saving have decreased, and threaten to further decrease, biodiversity in
New Mexican chile fields. A public-private collaboration between NMSU and private
corporations has shifted the emphasis of university research away from the empowerment
and benefit of local growers, consumers, and small businesses, towards increasing
markets across the globe for the profit of a smaller set of elite New Mexican growers and
processors, and corporations based far beyond any local watershed.
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Introduction

I first heard about the genetically engineered (GE) chile at the Albuquerque
growers market in the fall of 2009. I arrived an hour early to begin setting up my produce
stand. As I piled kale on the table my mind was slow to wake but something seemed
vaguely different from previous markets. Was it the crisp air or maybe the way the
speckled light of the early morning filtered through the cottonwoods at a slightly lower
angle? Perhaps it was the new vendor, the man in the safari hat selling peaches? No, there
was something else. It was in the air. Eventually I noticed a smoking black roaster
spinning the first green chile of the season. As any New Mexican will tell you, this is a
happy sight. This morning, though, that warm smell of green chile roasting- as much a
harbinger of fall here as the yellowing of the cottonwoods or the chimneys blowing piñon
smoke- portended more than just a fiery, delicious snack and the oncoming autumn.
It was New Mexico Native Chile Week and the roaster spun eight varieties of green
chile from different parts of the state. I eventually walked over and sampled some of the
chile. A worker explained to me as she handed me a chile sample that GE chile will soon
be commercially available in New Mexico, and that each of these varieties will be
threatened by contamination through genetic drift. She urged me to sign a post card to the
governor to support an upcoming bill to protect farmers from being sued for inadvertently
planting contaminated seeds.
After that market, and for the past two years, the GE chile issue stuck with me. As
a market grower, I wondered how this cross-pollinating and unwelcome guest would
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affect my farm. Was is it really true that a seed company would actually sue a small
grower, or even a home gardener, for unintentionally having or growing a pepper with
this unsolicited genome? How has such a pepper come to be, I wondered, and who asked
for it? My questions mounted and I began to talk to other farmers, interviewed food and
seed activists, visited the archives at NMSU and the Center for Southwest Research in
Albuquerque, and read as many different books on agricultural history, chile peppers, and
biotechnology as I could get my hands on. I have turned these two years of research into
an one hundred year narrative that examines how and why the chile pepper has changed
in New Mexico.
I borrow frameworks from several scholars to help guide the story. The notion of
industrial agriculture as an ecology of power that Christopher Henke puts forth in
Cultivating Science, Harvesting Power is a helpful starting point. Henke conceptualizes
an ecology of power as:

A broad system of social and material production that forms the larger
playing field where growers and agricultural scientists work to turn
products created from local contexts- food, commodities, data,
knowledge- into capital that is transferrable to other institutions. These
forms of economic and social capital are made valuable through this
process of exchange and, in turn, can provide actors with control and
influence over the very places and practices that serve as the basis for
this capital.

Henke argues that ultimate product of this ecology- consisting of growers, agricultural
scientists, farmworkers, land, plants, universities, and state legislatures- is power. To
Henke the metaphor of ecology gives agency to all actors in the formulation of power.
The history of industrial agriculture does not resemble an “irresistible treadmill” of
technological innovation and capital consolidation, but rather acts as a complex system of
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exchanges where the various ecological actors affect development of agriculture‟s
ultimate product: power.1
With this framework in mind, the ecology of the chile pepper in New Mexico has
grown considerably in the past century. The physical geography of the chile‟s social and
material ecosystem has expanded far beyond its local confines of the early 20th century,
and with that expansion the net worth of the industry and the cumulative power it
produces has grown significantly. The actors in this ecology- the growers, the research
scientists, the manufacturers of equipment, chemicals, and seeds, government
legislatures, the consumers, and even the genome of the chile itself- have become global.
As the ecology expanded, the actors driving the ecosystem the most have increasingly
had little or no ties to the local watersheds, ecosystems, and communities within the state.
To describe this ecological shift towards non-local actors, I borrow language from
historian Louis Warren. In The Hunter’s Game, Warren describes the shift in Western
public lands from a local commons controlled by local elites to one where more distant—
extra-local— elites gain control. The industrial chile‟s ecological expansion has often
involved a shift towards extra-local control of a commons. From the industrial influence
in the state‟s publicly funded land-grant institution to the genetically engineered chile and
commons of a gene pool it threatens to privatize, the trend of a previously public
commons being controlled by and for extra-local elites is a critical element to the chile
pepper‟s history in New Mexico. This paper offers a hundred year context for the
reduction of local control over the New Mexican chile‟s ecosystem and its commons. 2

1

Christopher Henke. Cultivating Science, Harvesting Power: Science and Industrial Agriculture in
California. MIT Press: Cambridge, 2008. 6.
2 Louis Warren. The Hunter’s Game: Poachers and Conservationists in Twentieth-Century America. Yale
University Press: New Haven, 1997. 179.

4
A central force driving the changes in the chile pepper has been the public-private
collaboration between the university and private industry, coined “the academicindustrial complex” by several critics and scholars. The notion of a public institution, and
especially a land-grant university, aiding private business interests is hardly new. Indeed,
the public land-grant university system was designed in 1862 with a goal, as Stephan
Jones argues, to aid small farmers in their private businesses and “to develop varieties of
plants and animals that would benefit farmers and consumers both financially and
nutritionally, and ultimately benefit society at large.”3 The question, however, of which
type of farmer should primarily benefit from this institution has been debated with
varying intensity for over a century. By the 1970s, critics openly questioned whether the
public-interest facet of the land-grant university mission had been lost as the universities
moved towards a complete melding with corporate interests. Former Texas agricultural
commissioner and outspoken populist, Jim Hightower, put the relationship in no
uncertain terms. “Although the land grant college complex was created to be the people‟s
university, to reach out to serve the various needs of a broad rural constituency,”
Hightower begins his 1973 Hard Tomatoes, Hard Times, “the system has, in fact, become
a sidekick and frequent servant of agriculture‟s industrialized elite.” Hightower goes on
to argue that while the university focus on scientific and business efficiency has led to

3

Jones, Stephen. In (Seed) Bed Together: Are Agro-Giants Taking Over University Research? Feb 13
2002 accessed at http://www.tompaine.com/feature.cfm/ID/5116. At the time he published this work,
Jones was a wheat breeder at Washington State University who appeared in headlines for refusing to work
with corporations to develop a herbicide resistant wheat.
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more (and over) production, it has enriched relatively few and has caused rural America
to “crumble.”4
Other scholars have more recently taken less sweeping attacks on the complex from
a variety of angles. While the corporate contracts certainly add a source for much needed
university funding, scholars have pointed out this academic-corporate bond creates
“potential conflicts of interest, redirection of research from basic to applied areas, erosion
of openness of scientific communication, and detrimental effect on graduate training.”5
The history I present here points to another possible consequence: a shift in university
resources and focus from the local to the extra-local.

To explain the ecological shifts of the New Mexican chile pepper, I begin roughly a
hundred years ago and break the story into three chapters. The first chapter focuses on the
first chile breeder at NMSU, Dr. Fabian Garcia, who served at NMSU for nearly the
entire first half of the 20th century. Garcia made significant efforts to disseminate his
research to large and small farmers throughout the state. He traveled to rural communities
throughout the state with the university‟s first improved chile variety, the number 9 chile,
which was popular among growers from northern New Mexico to the Mesilla Valley near
the Mexican border. Yet even during Garcia‟s tenure, the seeds of a major agricultural
and ecological shift in the state were beginning to sprout. This shift, part of the larger
Green Revolution transforming industrial agriculture throughout the nation and the

4

Jim Hightower. Hard Tomatoes, Hard Times: The Original Hightower Report- and Other Recent
Reports- On Problems and Prospects of American Agriculture. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Schenkman
Publishing Company, 1978. 1,2.
5 Sheldon Krimsky, James G. Ennis, and Robert Weissman. “Academic-Corporate Ties in Biotechnology:
A Quantitative Study,” Science, Technology, & Human Values, Vol. 16, No. 3 (Summer, 1991), 276.; Mark
Clayton, “Corporate Cash and Campus Labs” in The Christian Science Monitor, Tuesday, June 19, 2001.
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world, made satisfying the needs and goals of both small farmer and large commodity
producer increasingly difficult.
By the time of Garcia‟s death in 1948, the chile industry in southern New Mexico
was beginning to take form. By the mid 1970s, chile production in the southern part of
the state had begun to skyrocket. As production surged, the nature of the chile changed
and its ecology expanded to include extra-local corporations, investors, and markets. The
second chapter charts these changes and examines how various private sectors merged
with the university to develop, grow, promote, and sell chile, transforming the chile from
a local, regional crop into an international commodity.
The third chapter, spanning from the early 1990s through the present, covers a
period of decline in chile production from its high water mark in 1992. The North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), which took effect January 1, 1994,
restructured the industry and added immense competition to New Mexican growers.
Imports from foreign countries such as Mexico, China, and Peru surged, and many
growers had to invest more in expensive technologies and tried to integrate vertically to
compete. The industrial chile‟s ecology of power further consolidated into corporations
based out of state, shifted across borders, and entered the previously public commons of
the chile‟s genome. As the ecology expanded in these ways, it also contracted in others.
Large producers supplanted smaller producers, machines supplanted workers, and genetic
patents emerged to threaten the genetic diversity of the New Mexican chile. Thus, as the
New Mexican chile‟s ecology has expanded geographically in recent decades, it has also
become more consolidated and less diversified.
I finish this paper with the GE chile and the recent debate surrounding it. This
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controversial biotech development points both to the dominant trend of an ecological
expansion of New Mexico‟s industrial chile into extra-local territory, but also illustrates
how this expansion has not been unilateral, teleological, or uncontested. The recent
debate surrounding the GE chile demonstrates how some New Mexicans have resisted the
extra-local shift in New Mexican agriculture and have tried to re-center New Mexico‟s
chile pepper within a more local and locally diverse ecology.
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Chapter 1
Roots

When Dr. Fabian Garcia began his seed trials in 1907 at the New Mexico College
of Agriculture and Mechanic Arts (Later NMSU), horses pulled the plows, the Rio
Grande wreaked havoc on the floodplain in spring, and the fresh fruit and vegetables
grown in the valley were grown primarily with local and regional markets in mind. Food
production was spread out throughout the valleys of New Mexico on small, diversified
farms. Many farmers planted seeds that had passed through their families and
communities for generations. Cotton was the state‟s chief export crop and chile, reserved
almost entirely for local and regional fresh consumption, remained a minor crop. By the
end of Garcia‟s tenure at mid century, however, both the chile and its agricultural
landscape were in the midst of a profound transformation.
In the most general terms, this transformation was part of the Green Revolution
affecting agriculture across the nation and planet. Tractors slowly overtook horses,
synthetic herbicides, pesticides, and fertilizers became prevalent, and high yielding,
university bred hybrid seed varieties began to replace older seed stock. In New Mexico,
as in many other states, the land grant institution played a major role in facilitating this
revolution and paving the way for a future industrial chile empire. As the 20th century
approached its midway point, the land grant university‟s commitment to the emergent
Green Revolution meant the university could no longer easily satisfy the needs of small
and large farmer alike. Its focus had begun to shift away from a relatively large set of
small-scale producers with local markets and towards a much smaller set of large-scale
growers and processors competing in national and international markets.

9

The Early Years of New Mexico’s Land Grant Institution

The Morrill Land Grant Act of 1862 provided land and funds for each state to
develop an agricultural college at a time when 80% of the U.S. population lived in rural
communities and 59% of the total labor force worked in agriculture. The colleges aimed
to provide agricultural knowledge to the country‟s many small farmers, especially in the
West. In 1888, Congress added a research arm of the land grant schools with the Hatch
Act, which was to “have for their purpose the development and improvement of the rural
home and rural life and the maximum contribution by agriculture to the welfare of the
consumer.” Advocates of the Hatch Act argued the legislation should primarily support
small farmers and not larger businesses. “The farmer‟s work is not big business,” they
argued, “and he needs the assistance of the government where business and commerce do
not.” Almost from the inception of the agricultural research institutions, however, the
land grant research stations disseminated information most often to “the largest farms and
the best-educated farmers,” while the average, more isolated farmer did not have access
to the land grant information. In 1914, Progressives in Congress addressed this issue by
formally allocating funds through the Smith-Lever Act to create an extension service that
would disseminate the university research to the rural countryside.6
In the first few decades after Hiram Hadley founded the New Mexico College of
Agriculture and Mechanic Arts in 1888, the land grant university took various measures

6

Jim Hightower. Hard Tomatoes, Hard Times: The Original Hightower Report- and Other Recent
Reports- On Problems and Prospects of American Agriculture. Schenkman Publishing Company:
Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1978. 9-14. Also, Paul Conkin. A Revolution Down on the Farm: The
Transformation of American Agriculture since 1929. University of Kentucky Press: Lexington, 2008.
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to reach out to rural farmers. Only five years after the small college was founded, the
New Mexico Legislative Assembly passed acts to establish branch agricultural
experiment stations in various New Mexican counties that reflected the territory‟s wide
variety of soils and climatic conditions. The school‟s annual report of 1905-6 claimed
that “not only is it endeavor to supply information sought, but to impart it in such a way
as to insure its adoption, at least, experimentally. Every farmer should be an
experimenter.”7 At least in rhetoric, the school not only aspired to extend the results of its
research to the rural farmer, but also considered the rural farmer an integral part of that
research process. In the first decades of the university, with only the glimpses of
industrial agriculture peaking over the horizon, this was a reasonable aspiration. The
goals of small and large producers in New Mexico were similar enough for the land grant
school‟s research to benefit both.
The sprouts of a future agro-industry, however, were emerging across the
landscape during the first decades of the 20th century. The construction of the Elephant
Butte dam in southern New Mexico in 1916 transformed the once swampy and semi-wild
riparian zones of the Rio Grande into large swaths of reliable and controllable fertile
farmland. Under the terms of the Newlands Act, farmers in the area bought shares to help
fund dam construction with each share corresponding to acre-feet of water access once
the dam was completed.8 The Elephant Butte dam instigated an agricultural boom in the

7

“NMSU Annual Report, 1905-6.” Taken from Agricultural Research at New Mexico State University
Since 1889 (las Cruces, nm: March 1969) A76-85 Box 5 (Agr. Services) Rio Grande Collection. NMSU
Archives. Las Cruces, New Mexico, page 28.
8 Ira Clark. Water in New Mexico. Albuquerque: UNM Press, 1987. 195.
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valley, with many farmers growing on relatively small tracts of land that, according to the
university president of the time, H.L Kent, were roughly “10 to 30 acres.”9
Early food processing enterprises also emerged during this time. The Mesilla
Canning Company, founded in the late 19th century by Theodore Rouault, won a prize for
its canned chile at the Louisiana Purchase Exhibition in St. Louis in 1904. Yet the
company‟s processing levels remained small, and the company was not enough to
transform the chile from a local and regional crop into a national or global one. By the
1930s, the growing canning industry in the region, still dwarfed by California businesses,
produced roughly 100,000 cans of green chile for consumers in El Paso and southern
New Mexico.10
On farms, the new technological order came slowly but steadily. Tractor use
increased significantly on New Mexico farms between 1920 and 1950. The 1920 census
reported 457 farms using tractors in New Mexico; by 1950 the number had risen to 10,
526.11 Yet even on large farms, horses continued to work the fields as late as the 1940s.
Fertilizer was rare, with some farmers relying simply on the richness of the floodplain
soil, the water from the ditch, and manure from the teams of horses.12 Yet even before the
introduction of synthetic pesticides, the concept of spraying poisons on commercial
produce was well underway and encouraged by agricultural experts. Fabian Garcia
published a 1902 bulletin that advocated spraying, deeming it an inevitable technology
for New Mexican apple growers. “The time is coming when our apple growers will have

9

Kent Paterson. The Hot Empire of Chile. Tempe: Bilingual Press, 2000. 41, 83.
Ibid, 106.
11 Census of Agriculture, 1950. vol. 1 Part 30 New Mexico. U.S. Government Printing Office, 1952. 6.
12 Ed Remondini interview in the “POW in New Mexico Agriculture Oral History Project.” Rio Grande
Historical Collections, NMSU Archives. Las Cruces, New Mexico.
10
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to spray,” he insisted, spraying “seems to be the best and most economical way of
fighting the insect.”13
All these technological improvements required more capital investment from the
farmer. Whether it was investment shares in the dam construction, tractors and
implements, or chemical pesticides, the upfront cost of farming was increasing with the
promise of greater yields. Despite these foreboding elements of industrial agriculture,
however, the transformations of the landscape were slight compared to those to come.
Throughout this time the chile pepper remained a minor commercial crop. The
chile‟s small commercial value stemmed from its lack of popularity among non-Hispanic
populations in the U.S., the fact that it was not conducive to mechanical growing,
harvesting, or processing, and that it had succumbed to diseases that made it difficult to
grow in commercial numbers at all. Yet for several reasons New Mexico, and especially
southern New Mexico, was ripe for large-scale chile production. Unlike California and
Texas, where early commercial production had already begun, southern New Mexico had
disease-free soil. It also had lots of sun and a long enough growing season. The
construction of the Elephant butte dam ensured that the area would have enough water for
commercial agriculture, and last but certainly not least, its proximity to Mexico ensured
access to cheap labor from across the border.14

The Number 9

13

Fabian Garcia. Spraying Orchards for the Coddling Moth. Santa Fe: New Mexican Printing Company,
1902. 12, 13.
14 Paterson, Empire. 42.
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Fabian Garcia understood the potential of commercial chile and set out to develop
a pepper that could scale up and be profitable to New Mexican farmers. At the time of
his chile trials, local growers preferred several types of native chiles, including the pasilla
(dark brown), colorado (red), and negro (black). Garcia used seed from all three types,
which included both New Mexican and Chihuahuan strains.15 Garcia chose to maintain
the redness of the Colorado, and within thirteen years had developed a red chile that
resisted the wilt better than many native strains. And although it was bred for the
southern new Mexican climate, it did well up north and helped farmers pull in record
yields. Small farmers throughout the agricultural valleys of the state had found a disease
resistant chile that offered higher yields and grew well in their climate. 16
Garcia worked hard to promote his research and improved seed varieties to
farmers throughout the state. Perhaps no one at NMSU better embodied the land grant
university‟s early spirit of outreach to rural farmers than Garcia. He toured widely as an
extension specialist in horticulture, offering his latest research findings to the countryside
in both English and Spanish. In 1916, the superintendent of the Institute of Indian School
Workers wrote to Garcia‟s boss at the extension service in regard to one of Garcia‟s
recent trips. “Professor Garcia‟s work was of a high standard,” the superintendent wrote,
“and was much appreciated by the large numbers who attended his instruction periods.
We feel that his practical talks were of great benefit and I am sure that all who heard him
felt amply repaid for coming to our institute.”17 In 1930, Garcia joined the “New Mexico

Danise Coon, Eric Votava, and Paul W. Bosland, “The Chile Cultivars of New Mexico State University
Released from 1913 to 2008,” Research report 763. Las Cruces, November 2008.
16 Paterson. Empire. 17, 18.
15

17

Letter from the superintendent of the institute of Indian school workers to A.C. Cooley, director of
extension. BOX 4- Folder 5- Professional Correspondence, 1885-1919. Fabian Garcia Papers, NMSU
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Farm and Home Special,” a train that traveled throughout the New Mexican country side
making 52 stops in two weeks. Garcia gave talks in Spanish and English on matters such
as “Crop Improvement with Special Reference to Chili and Wheat.”18 On the radio
station KOB, Garcia‟s staff aired 44 radio talks in 1933, 15 in 1934, and 8 in 1935.19
Garcia believed his research could genuinely help the small farmers across the state and
worked hard to get information to them.
Yet as important as the small grower was to him, Garcia bred the number 9
primarily with processors, not small growers, in mind. The chief goal of the chile
research was to help New Mexican chile growers scale up. As he explained in his official
summation of his research, his new variety was “larger, smoother, fleshier, more tapering
and included a shoulder-less pod for canning purposes.” Perhaps its most important trait
was its mildness, which Garcia believed would help increase its popularity among the
Anglo population.20 By breeding for traits that would transform chile into an export crop,
the number 9 represents an important shift away from local tastes.
The number 9 represented a step towards an industrialized chile, one that was mild,
larger, and easier to process, yet it was only a step. The number 9 did not fundamentally
transform the chile pepper or the industry. Farmers continued to grow several different
land race varieties through the forties. Photographs in a 1947 department of tourism
collection, for example, show Mesilla Valley chile pickers in fields of small pasilla-type
peppers. Throughout Garcia‟s tenure, the chile remained a minor commercial crop in the

Archives, Las Cruces, New Mexico.
18 Paterson. Empire. 18, 19.
19 Agricultural Research at New Mexico State University Since 1889 (las Cruces, nm: march 1969) A76-85
Box 5 (Agr. Services), NMSU Archives, Las Cruces, New Mexico, 29.
20 Danise Coon, Eric Votava, and Paul W. Bosland, “The Chile Cultivars of New Mexico State University
Released from 1913 to 2008,” Research report 763. Las Cruces, November 2008.
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state, and he focused much of his energy on a variety of other crops, such as apples,
pecans, peaches, grapes, onions, garlic, spinach, and cotton, the main commercial crop in
southern New Mexico.21
Garcia acknowledged the limitations of his number 9 chile and called on the
farmers themselves to help further improve it. “There are always some plants in the field
which tend to revert back,” Garcia wrote in his bulletin on the pepper in 1921,
“consequently, it is very necessary to select seed in the field.”22 Garcia‟s comment not
only points to the inconsistency of the number 9, but also harkens back to the college‟s
statement in its annual report fifteen years earlier when it called on all farmers to be
experimenters and share in the research process. Garcia‟s comment illustrates that during
this period farmers maintained a degree of responsibility in the breeding process.
While the number 9 represents an important early step towards developing the
chile as a non-local export commodity, the lines between local and non-local were not yet
as clearly drawn on industrial lines as they would later become. Garcia was able to satisfy
both small growers and processors alike because ultimately their goals did not diverge
drastically. There was still a reasonable expectation that if chile became a valuable export
crop, the demand for it would benefit chile farmers, large and small, throughout the state.
The time of large scale, consolidated, mechanized and pesticide-laden monocultures
grown under contract to processors with distant headquarters was simply not yet a reality.
21

Worker, chile fields” New Mexico State Archives, Collection 1987-066 - New Mexico Department of
Tourism photograph collection, item 065408, Box 18244, Folder 292; For the lack of impact of the no.9 on
pre-WWII chile production, I gathered information from various interviews in the “POWs in New Mexico
Agriculture Oral History Project” from the Rio Grande Historical Collections at the archives in NMSU
library. Interviewees I looked at included Rose Mitamura Ed Remondini, Clara Jo (Jody) McSherry, G.X.
McSherry, and Roy Nakayama‟s sister-in-law, Toshi Nakayama, all of whom described various vegetables,
but not the chile, as their main market crops in years during and directly following WWII. Furthermore, the
majority of papers in Fabian Garcia‟s collection deal with crops other than chile.
22 Danise Coon, Eric Votava, and Paul W. Bosland, “The Chile Cultivars of New Mexico State University
Released from 1913 to 2008,” Research report 763. Las Cruces, November 2008.
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Garcia‟s personal financial investment in local industry illustrates the degree it
was still possible to concurrently support industry and the local economy. Garcia was a
frugal steward of the wealth he married into, and invested in a diversity of local
businesses. Among his many investments, Garcia invested heavily in the local Mesilla
valley green chile canning company, the Mesilla Valley Fruit Association and in the
Dona Ana county fair association. Even Garcia‟s numerous investments in various Texas
and New Mexico based petroleum companies demonstrate a commitment to both industry
and local and regional businesses. Garcia‟s investments in industry, both in his
professional work and his personal finances, were not wholly inconsistent with his
commitment to New Mexican small farmers.23
Fabian Garcia and his number 9 chile are significant in the history of the New
Mexican chile industry. Later revered as the “patron saint of chile,” by industry
marketers, Garcia was the first to steer University research and resources towards
developing a chile conducive to industry. While the number 9 itself contained too many
imperfections to become the industry standard, it nonetheless represents the beginnings of
a university mentality to work towards an industry friendly, export crop. Yet equally
significant to this chapter of New Mexican agricultural history is the extent to which
developing such an export crop could benefit growers of different sizes across the state.
The number 9 was popular statewide and offered promise to a majority of growers, large
and small. Garcia aspired to spread his research to all farmers, and believed his work
could benefit a great many of them. Yet the time was fast emerging in New Mexico, and
23Fabian

Garcia Papers. BOX 4- Folder 5- Professional Correspondence, 1885-1919. Between 1913 and
1914, Garcia bought ten shares of the Mesilla Valley Canning Company, seventy shares of the Mesilla
Valley Fruit Association, five shares of the Dona Ana County Fair Association, and in 1919, bought oil
shares in the Texas Crude Oil Company (Ft. Worth), Ossenbeck Oil (Wichita Falls), W.W. Cox Oil
Company (New Mexico), and the Southwestern Oil Development Company (El Paso)
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the rest of the country and world, when the goals of small farmer and larger agrocommodity producer would become too opposed to make Garcia‟s aspiration attainable.

Chapter 2
Commodity Expansion and the Academic Industrial Complex

In the three decades after World War II, chile grew from a relatively small and local
crop to southern New Mexico‟s chief export commodity crop. In Doña Ana county,
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which lies in the irrigated southern New Mexico where the industry‟s growth was most
concentrated, the number of acres in chile jumped sixteen fold over between 1945 and
1975. The Green Revolution- the broad term for the introduction of agricultural
innovations such as advanced mechanization, synthetic fertilizers and pesticides, and
improved seed varieties that stimulated post war industrial agricultural growth
worldwide- was in full bloom in southern New Mexico.
The chile pepper gained its preeminent role in southern New Mexico‟s
industrialized agricultural landscape through a collaborative public-private effort among
chile producers, processors and NMSU. This collaboration illustrates a dramatic shift in
publicly funded land grant attention away from the local and towards the extra-local.
What is remarkable in this story is not that the University aided research for the chile
industry, but rather that the University aided the industry- not just in plant research but
also in marketing and promotion- to such an extent that the goals of the University and
those of the industry were nearly identical.
Scholars generally mark the 1973 discovery of recombinant DNA (rDNA), and the
surge of biotechnology firms that emerged to patent the genetic engineering made
possible through the discovery, as the beginning of a new era in the academic-industrial
complex. In 1980, the Bayh-Dole Act sped up the patenting process for university
research and caused a large increase in the number of biotech companies pursuing
university contracts. Prior to the Act, in the 1970s, only a few hundred patents were
issued each year from university research, while by the end of the century the number had
grown roughly thirty five fold. This process has proven quite lucrative for universities
and corporations alike. Universities have reportedly generated $641 million in gross
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income through industry licenses and created an estimated $40 billion of total economic
activity.24
This chapter demonstrates that this intertwined public-corporate relationship was
well established in New Mexico by the time the Bayh-Dole Act eased the way for biotech
companies to patent the genetically modified organisms developed at land-grant
institutions. Indeed, by 2009, when the GE chile was debated on the floor of the New
Mexican legislature and its opponents challenged whether the relationship between the
chile processors, University, and major seed corporations were good for New Mexican
farmers and consumers, this tight-knit corporate-academic relationship surrounding New
Mexican chile research was already well into its fourth decade. The chile has bore the
effects of this relationship for just as long.

Genetic Changes

Central to the industry‟s growth were changes to the chile pepper itself. Fabian
Garcia‟s successors at NMSU continued the trend to breed chile specifically for industry.
Unlike Garcia‟s number 9, the post war NMSU chile varieties no longer relied on small
farmers to help in the breeding process. The characteristics of the newer varieties,
focusing on mildness for an export market and shape, color, and ripening uniformity for
mechanization and processing, no longer overlapped with the traits a small grower for
local or regional sales would look for. By the 1970s, the chile pepper had taken on far
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different characteristics than the landrace varieties grown in the first part of the century or
even the number 9.
The pepper variety that facilitated a significantly scaled-up industry came in 1950,
when NMSU breeder Roy Harper came out with the New Mexico no. 6. This pepper,
derived from a local landrace variety, was milder, higher yielding, shorter, more uniform
in color, and faster maturing than the no. 9. As a 2008 NMSU extension bulletin puts it,
this pepper was thus “particularly well-suited for the processing industry and for
producing green chile for the fresh market.” Certain qualities, such as concurrent
maturation and easy de-stemming, were valuable because they were more labor efficient
to harvest and process. The no. 6 was made milder and renamed the no. 6-4 in 1957, and
has remained a staple variety for the industry since. Roy Nakayama, who seceded Harper
as chief breeder at NMSU, explained the significance of this new cultivar in a 1976
interview with New Mexico Magazine. “The big difference, actually, way back then- even
prior to 1955- was that about the only variety available here was a real hot chile. Too
doggone hot for most,” Nakayama recalled, “most of it was native chile, with some New
Mexico No. 9. That No. 9 was larger-bodied, but it was too hot... We couldn‟t sell it
outside the state.” 25
As Nakayama suggests, the transition from a statewide to national market began
with these new varieties. A 1981 NMSU extension pamphlet explains “by the 1960s
chile production had begun the transition from a small-farm, cash crop to a high value
crop attractive for large and small farms alike.” Chile researcher, Donald Cotter, puts
this the transition in starker terms with no mention of future small farms, writing that the
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6-4 marked a “transition from a cash crop for producers with small acreages to an
attractive, high income crop in modern irrigated agriculture.”26
The industry thus owes part of its growth to a chile capable of being grown and
harvested in a much more efficient, less labor-intensive way, and capable of appealing to
a larger, national market. The success of these varieties led many farmers to plant chile in
the same fields year after year, greatly increasing the plant‟s susceptibility to virulent
pathogenic diseases. 27 Such diseases led not to a fundamental redress of monocultures,
crop rotations, and other industrial farming methods, but rather to more research on
disease resistant varieties and chemical herbicides and pesticides. Throughout the growth
of the industry in the second half of the 20th century, the growing chile agribusiness
prompted more research into developing a more fit chile for industrial production and
processing. The resulting chile varieties increasingly embodied a shift from the local to
the non-local. These chiles, bred no longer by various farmers in their fields but by
university researchers, represented a move away from decentralized and localized
expertise for the purposes of local sales and consumption towards a centralized university
project for an industrial export crop for a national and international market.

Mountain Pass and the Connoisseurs

Although instrumental in the industry‟s rise, the new chile varieties could not alone
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facilitate the chile industry‟s boom. As late as 1968, it was still unclear how well the
chile could do for growers. An article in a Clovis newspaper headlined: “chile could be
good crop for farmers in New Mexico.” This article detailed how to grow commercial
chile for a farming audience that presumably did not have much experience with the crop.
By the mid-1970s, newspapers were singing a different tune. An article in 1976 Las
Cruces Sun-News reads: “Chile Growing Booms, Future Bright.” Census data reflects
this boom clearly. Whereas in 1959, Doña Ana county growers grew roughly 500 acres of
chile, they were growing over 5000 acres by the end of the 1970s. 28Two key players in
the chile industry help explain how and why this rise in chile production occurred:
processors such as Mountain Pass cannery; and the NMSU chile promotion group, the
International Connoisseurs of Red and Green.
After World War II, processors eager to convert a seasonal crop into a yearlong
product for consumption emerged in greater numbers and began to drive the industry.
While the growers themselves were significant players, they increasingly began to grow
under a contract of the processors. In 1959, for example, a local cannery bought all the
available seed of the newly developed 6-4 variety.29 The development of more easily
peeled varieties, along with emergence of widespread refrigeration, also gave rise to a
wholly new product, frozen green chile, the specialty of processors such as Encanto
Foods (Later Bueno Foods). By 1977, there were at least 17 major processors in the
southwest. While the cumulative role of the processors was certainly significant and
28
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several processors were prominent (Biad Chile Products of Rincon, NM and the red chile
giant, Cal Compac, of Santa Ana, California, for example), perhaps no processor played a
bigger role in this decade in the promotion of the chile than Mountain Pass Cannery.
Mountain Pass offers an important view into the interlocking relationship between
corporations, growers, and the university throughout the 1970s.30
Mountain Pass Cannery, the maker of the famous Old El Paso salsa, had been in
business in Anthony, TX, just twenty five miles from Las Cruces, since 1918. In 1968, a
transnational food conglomerate, Pet Food, Inc, bought Mountain Pass and subsequently
fueled the marketing blitz on the chile that helped the industry boom in the following
decade.31 The relationship between the university and processor became increasingly
intertwined along the way.
Seeking to spur developments of a chile variety more conducive to industrial
processing and widespread marketing, Mountain Pass took a major step towards a
merged academic-corporate chile agenda when it began underwriting chile research itself.
They delivered a $5884 grant to NMSU for chile research in 1976, for example, and even
wrote a $1000 personal check to Roy Nakayama in 1974. For all sides, it seems, this was
a happy relationship. Upon receiving his check, Nakayama simply expressed his gratitude
of the “industry‟s interest in chile research and that extra money has been added beyond
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state appropriations as incentives for researchers.”32
Mountain Pass‟s involvement with the University did not stop there. While the
ability to grow much more chile and process it efficiently was paramount to the
industry‟s growth, equally important was the ability to sell it. There needed to be an
increased market with the increased crop, and thus promotion was critical. While events
such as the Hatch Chile Festivals, which began in 1971, or Governor Bruce King‟s
proclamation of “Chile Week” in 1974 played meaningful roles in promoting the crop,
the industry often took promotion into their own hands by sponsoring events such as a
“green chile recipe fiesta” and green chile cook-off at NMSU in 1972.
In 1973, however, the university relieved the industry of some of its promotional
work by funding their own chile promotional group. Officially known as the International
Connoisseurs of Green and Red Chile, the group soon became the biggest promotional
actor for the chile in the state.33 Instead of each processor doing their own promotional
work, the university group consolidated that effort. Mountain Pass, like several
processors, simply gave money to the group to do promotions for them. They wrote a
check to the group for $3000 in 1974 and a $4000 check in 1977.34 By taking on the
promotional work of the industry, then, the connoisseurs represent a university
collaboration with the industry that extended from seed to sales.
The brief history of the connoisseurs (the group disbanded in the early eighties)
illustrates how closely the interests of NMSU and those of the industry had become
during this period. The group began after Gene Elliot, NMSU‟s director of Alumni
32
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Relations and David Roswell, the university‟s director of Information Services,
convinced NMSU president Gerald Thomas that a “promotional stint involving the chile
might be good for the university.” The group had 187 members by the end of its first year
and grew to over 3000 by 1977. Their members included all the major processors
throughout the southwest, large chile growers, area restaurants, the Las Cruces Chamber
of Commerce, and even such far-flung celebrities as Bob Hope, Vickie Carr, Paul
Harvey, and Lawrence Welk. Gerald Thomas, whom the group‟s event coordinator
referred to as the “top chile ambassador,” succinctly framed the group‟s purpose as an
effort to get “growers, processors, and researchers [to] work together to promote one
particular product: chile.”35
The group‟s name alone says a lot. By calling themselves international, they were
clearly moving away from a local market and promoting an expansion of the chile far
beyond New Mexico. By calling themselves Connoisseurs, they were invoking a sense
that the chile was a high-class vegetable. The promotional tactic of up-classing the chile,
complete with global celebrities on their membership role, illustrates the extra-local aims
of the group to expand markets and even increase prices while at it. This tactic seemed to
work for chile farmers such as Ray Enriquez. In 1976, Enriquez was growing over 600
acres of chile and attributed the growing chile industry not only to an increased number
of processors, but also for an expanding taste for New Mexican food beyond New
Mexico. Part of this newfound appreciation for the chile, he explained, was in how it was
perceived. “When I was a kid this kind of food was considered poor Mexican dishes.
People would get together and plant one acre of chile that would take care of four or five

35

“Last of the Red Hot Lovers? No Such Thing...” Las Cruces Sun-News August 11 1977, page 17;
“Society Given Promotion Check” Las Cruces Sun-News December 25, 1977, page 32.

26
families. Now chile dishes are considered gourmet food.”36
The connoisseurs took on various venues for chile promotion. They published
cookbooks, staged chile cook-offs, sent “care packages” of chile seeds to far corners of
the globe, and put on conferences. They even helped escalate a “Great Chile War” in the
U.S. Congress in 1974, by providing New Mexican chile products and an NMSU
cookbook to seven non-New Mexican congressional members who had reportedly
claimed the superiority of their state‟s chile. In addition to the chile products they sent,
they also offered to stage a chile cook-off in New Mexico with none other than Roy
Nakayama as presiding judge. While the light-hearted spirit of the group is evident here,
so too is their concerted effort to promote not just chile, but specifically NMSU‟s brand
of chile.37
The International Chile Conferences, which began in 1977, kept the Connoisseurs
especially busy. Their first conference included discussions on new developments in the
green chile industry, a presentation by a New Mexico Department of Agriculture
marketing specialist, an engineering specialist sharing new mechanical advances in chile
production, a panel of processors speaking to growers on how to most efficiently produce
chile for processing, and a panel of producers discussing growing techniques. These
conferences, perhaps better than any other single event, reflect the growing industry and
its push to expand its markets, and the connoisseur‟s (and thus NMSU‟s) efforts to aid in
that effort.38
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NMSU‟s increased commitment to the chile industry was further demonstrated
through their breeding program. The effort to craft an industrial chile, with roots in
Fabian Garcia‟s number 9, continued in earnest throughout the 1970s and took on a new
look. This new look was shaped heavily by NMSU‟s head chile researcher at the time,
Roy Nakayama.
In 1974, Nakayama released the NuMex Big Jim, which grew nearly a foot long
and was by most accounts the largest chile variety known. While Nakayama certainly
wanted a chile with nice flavor, the characteristics he bred for were, as John Crenshaw
reported, pods that “mature concurrently, making machine picking- and thus greater
acreage- possible.” Like the other industrial varieties before it, this variety incorporated
genetics from various landrace chiles. It culminated a decade-long effort to cross a small
Peruvian variety with an Anaheim, native Chimayó and other New Mexican varieties and
initially received quite favorable reviews.39 “There‟s no comparison between chile now
and 20 years ago,” remarked Jerry Phillips, director of marketing for Mountain Pass, to
the Albuquerque Journal. “Before Roy developed the large „Big Jim‟ variety grown
around here now, it was just hit and miss. Then, we paid workers 25¢ and 50¢ per hour,
and now we pay them $2.20 an hour, and we still come out better because the large new
variety can be peeled faster.”40 Just as previous varieties were developed to improve
industrial efficiency, this variety was similarly touted by Mountain Pass (Nakayama‟s
personal benefactor) in terms of efficiency in labor.
Yet despite the exuberant language of reviewers such as Mountain Pass, more
recent recollections downplay the variety‟s significance. Cotter writes that the NuMex
39
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Big Jim‟s “impact on the processing industries has been mixed” and the official NMSU
bulletin on historical chile cultivars describes its significance not in terms of its impact on
the industry but rather for its novel length, mentioning its listing in the Guinness Book of
Records, and as a “a favorite of home gardeners and chefs for making chile rellenos.” By
most recent accounts, other chile cultivars, such as the 6-4, have shaped the industry
more.41
What‟s significant about Nakayama‟s NuMex Big Jim, then, is not so much how it
revolutionized the chile industry. The chile‟s significance, instead, is that it highlights the
university‟s ongoing quest during this time for a more perfect chile that was better suited
to vast acreages of mechanical production. Equally significant is the promotional reaction
to Roy Nakayama and the NuMex Big Jim. Unlike previous breeders, who arguably
shaped the chile‟s genetics more, Nakayama was the first breeder to achieve celebrity
status. In addition to articles profiling him as “Mr. Chile,” Nakayama was often enlisted
as the official judge at chile cook-offs and competitions and became a local celebrity as
part of a larger campaign to promote the chile. In a sense he became an icon when the
industry, increasingly becoming non-local and faceless, needed a face. With the NuMex
Big Jim, the personal check from Mountain Pass, and his position as a local celebrity,
Nakayama thus embodies the merged interests of the industry and the University.
What it important to take away here is that the University- through both its breeding
program and its promotional group- played a pivotal role in shaping the growth of the
chile industry. Equally true, the growing industry increasingly shaped NMSU‟s agenda.
41
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This relationship had a significant impact on the chile itself. The types of chiles grown in
Dona Ana county went from a diverse set of landrace and open-pollinated varieties, bred
over centuries for local use, to a small handful of NMSU cultivars specifically bred to be
processed and shipped elsewhere. All the while, the University aided the project not only
by providing industry-conducive seeds, but also by promoting the chile abroad to
potential new markets. The overall result was a university-corporate collaborative effort
that helped shift the chile away from the local market and the relatively small fields of the
farmers who once played a role breeding it, towards large, industrial agribusiness
acreages whose farmers, under processor contract, grew a crop destined for more distant
global markets.
The chile industry continued to flourish throughout the 1980s and early 1990s.
During this time, the discussion surrounding the growth of the chile industry centered on
breeding an ultra-mild chile for paprika processing. In a sense, this represents a further
turn from the local- a shift from the fiery chiles that non-locals could not handle towards
a virtually tasteless chile designed for food coloring in global food industry products
from ketchup, to hot dogs, to anything else that needs a red tint. Also during this period,
NMSU came out with their first of many ornamental chile varieties. Again, like paprika
breeding, the university focus on peppers not even meant for human consumption speaks
to how far the program had changed since the days Fabian Garcia toured the countryside
with his number 9 chile.
Indeed, many of the trends evident in this chapter continued during this time. The
industry‟s processors supplied bigger checks for university research and put on larger
conferences. The Connoisseurs, limited by funding, disbanded and many members re-
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organized under legislative funding as the New Mexico Chile Commodity Commission in
1985. 42Today then it should not be surprising that the major backers of the GE chile not
only include the major biotech seed company, Syngenta, but also the major chile
processors that have been working with the university for decades.
As the chile took its extra-local turn and began to gain popularity in new markets, it
became a local source of pride for many New Mexicans. Yet somewhat ironically, this
“traditional” New Mexican vegetable that distant consumers were becoming acquainted
with was actually quite new due to drastic changes in appearance, taste, and presentation.
As Ana Baca of Bueno Foods mentions in her 1992 cookbook, the chile processors had to
adopt “more lenient traditions” as they expanded beyond the seasons and locales that had
previously bound them.43 The industrial chile illustrates that the chile and its traditions
are ever changing. The following chapter examines how in recent decades, as the industry
has faced decline and New Mexican growers have looked to reclaim the glory days with
newer technologies that include a GE chile, the question of who drives those changes has
become all the more pressing.
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Chapter 3
NAFTA, Labor, and the Technological Divide

NAFTA shook up the structure of the U.S.-Mexico border and sent the industry
reeling and the workers scrambling. Producers could not compete with Mexico, where
laborers made roughly five times less. Mexican imports, which had already been rising,
surged. In the first five years after NAFTA, chile imports passing through New Mexican
ports of entry rose from less than 5,000 metric tons to well over 50,000 metric tons.44
Acreage dropped from its peak in New Mexico at 34,500 in 1992 to 11,100 acres
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harvested in 2008.45 The bigger New Mexican producers vertically integrated their
operations to include primary processing and contracting chile from Mexican growers.
All the while, the producers increased their pressure on university and corporate
researchers to develop technological solutions and effectively offset the Mexican labor
advantage with the New Mexican advantage of having technology and the available
capital to afford it. The post NAFTA surge in mechanization exacerbated the tenuous
position of many workers, as jobs became scarcer and incomes dropped by as much as
two-thirds since the onset of widespread farm mechanization. The most recent
development in the public-private collaborative search for more a capital-intensive
technological solution- the GE chile- has further expanded the ecology of the chile into
the realm of a transnational seed corporation.

A Reshaped Border

In the decade preceding NAFTA, Mexican chile imports were slowly increasing.
Within the first four years of NAFTA these imports skyrocketed and the vast majority of
New Mexican green jalapeño and red cayenne production went south. It became common
to see semi trucks with Mexican plates docked at the processing plants around Hatch,
NM.46
At first, many New Mexican growers, viewed Mexico‟s comparatively cheap and
abundant labor supply with competitive dismay. More recently, threats of Mexican
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competition have been muted by the larger threat of other foreign producers, mainly
China. By 2005, an agricultural engineer at NMSU could claim that it‟s not “us against
Mexico,” but rather, “the big worry is China and Africa.” China is a huge competitor, and
Africa grows a tremendous amount of chile. As early as 1998, the majority of global chile
production took place in Asia and fewer than ten percent took place in North America. In
the face of this larger global competition, the chile producing border region began to
merge.47
The degree to which New Mexican and Chihuahuan producers have merged since
NAFTA highlights the new order. Chihuahuan producers have long taken advantage of
their proximity to NMSU, soliciting university advice, seeds, and technological expertise.
Yet a recent study involving ten chile producers in Chihuahua points to a degree of
merging with the U.S. beyond such solicitations. The authors observed that every
Chihuahuan chile farmer spoke English, used U.S. mailing addresses, maintained
checking accounts in U.S. banks, deposited checks written by U.S. processors
denominated in dollars into their U.S. bank accounts, purchased U.S. inputs with U.S.
funds, and quoted prices in dollars per U.S. unit for virtually all purchased inputs
including machinery, fertilizer, chemicals and seed. In addition, most Chihuahuan
producers carry cell phones with a U.S. telephone number. These observations, perhaps
even more than the numbers, highlight the interconnections of the chile‟s ecology along
the border.48
For many small chile growers in New Mexico, however, navigating this merged
border has been difficult. The post-NAFTA New Mexican chile grower has had little
47
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choice but to merge, which for many growers means shifting the decimal point on their
investments a few spaces to the right. Growers not only had to grow in larger numbers,
but also integrate vertically. As the long time reporter on the chile industry, Kent
Paterson, explained, “the [post-NAFTA] modern chile farmer would have to be
simultaneously a grower, contractor, middleman, and primary processor, like it or not.” A
trend developed that, as Paterson wrote at the time, thinned “the ranks of chile farmers,
leaving a few with one foot in New Mexico, the other in Old Mexico.”49 The Vado, NM
based Cervantes Enterprises Inc., which uses cayenne peppers to make spicy mash for
Cajun-style hot sauces, exemplifies this trend. Managing Vice President, Dino Cervantes,
told the New Mexico Business Weekly in 2008 that “ten years ago, we bought about onethird of our chile from Mexico, but now we get about two-thirds of it from there.”
Cervantes went on to explain that “a lot of our competitors are looking at setting up
operations in Mexico, the Caribbean and Central and South America…we‟re committed
to the state, but eventually it might make economic sense to move our operation or sell it
off.”50
For the small growers, the industry trend of expanding operations across
international borders has meant that their increased competition was not as much from
Mexican growers but rather from those U.S. growers who had expanded. Paterson
explains the effect of NAFTA on small New Mexican growers as follows:
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In essence, however, what U.S. growers were really faced with was not the
prospect of competing with Mexicans per se, many of whom ran small
farms that paled in technological comparison, but with U.S.-based
corporations and farmers who were gradually assuming increased control
over Mexican agricultural production. 51

NAFTA compelled producers and processors to get bigger, outcompete smaller
New Mexican growers, and consolidate the industry in part by sourcing production south
of the border. In this sense, NAFTA has closed the distance between the two by allowing
product to move more cheaply. Yet, this opening of the border resulted partly from a
closing on another front, i.e. labor. New Mexican producers routinely complain that the
tightening of border security has hurt their workforce. NAFTA refashioned the border
from being porous with workers but not chile, to one porous with chile but not workers.

Labor

The chile industry was built on the reliability of cheap, mostly Mexican, labor and
has benefitted from its close proximity to the border for that reason. The first wave of
chile laborers in the fledgling industry were braceros. The Bracero program brought in
nearly 5 million Mexican-born guest farm workers from 1942 to 1964. After the bracero
program ended abruptly in 1964, some growers had to scale back chile production but
many producers continued to grow by hiring illegal workers.52
The primarily Mexican, post-Bracero chile workers endured the type of notoriously
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harsh working conditions that Cesar Chavez and the UFW brought to the world‟s
attention. Their wages were low (the going rate for a chile picker in 1974 was between $1
and $1.25 per hour compared to the $2.00 per hour minimum wage at the time), their
housing was often over packed and substandard, their benefits were nonexistent, and their
living environment was insulting. 53A 1974 article from the Las Cruces Sun-News, for
example, used both paternalistic and derisive language when describing the migrants as
hardworking and obliging while at the same time prone to prostitution, STDs, shoplifting,
and stressing local medical care.54
The farmworkers began to organize themselves in the late 1970s. By 1984, one
hundred farmworkers from the U.S. and Mexico had formed La Union de Trabajadores
Agricolas Fronterizos (The Border Agricultural Workers Union), and in the same year
organized 500 chile pickers to strike throughout the Mesilla Valley. The strike was
broken and the workers, many of whom were afraid to return to work, had gained a small
increase in piece rates per bucket of harvested chile. After years of sustained activism,
New Mexican chile pickers again struck in 1992, this time against the biggest chile
grower in the southern Rio Grande valley, Loyad Anderson. The police and border patrol
came onto the farm and, according to some workers gassed them with, ironically enough,
pepper gas. The workers wound up negotiating with Anderson, but like the strike in 1984,

53

For chile worker wages in 1974, see Ray Lopez. “Alien Problem Has Possible Solutions,” Las Cruces
Sun-News, August 5, 1974. accessed
http://access.newspaperarchive.com.libproxy.unm.edu/Viewer.aspx?img=50597261&firstvisit=true&src=se
arch&currentResult=1 For history of Federal minimum wages, see United States Department of Labor.
Wage and Hour Division (WHD): History of Changes to the Minimum Wage Law (Adapted from
Minimum Wage and Maximum Hours Standards Under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 1988 Report to the
Congress under Section 4(d)(1) of the FLSA). Accessed http://www.dol.gov/whd/minwage/coverage.htm
54 Ray Lopez, “Illegal Aliens Stream Across Border for Agricultural Work” Las Cruces Sun-News, July
31, 1974. Accessed
http://access.newspaperarchive.com.libproxy.unm.edu/Viewer.aspx?img=55080539&firstvisit=true&src=se
arch&currentResult=3.

37
they again fell short of many of their demands and only achieved a small increase in the
piece rate. 55 Despite these actions and sustained efforts by workers and activists, farm
workers in New Mexico saw few improvements in their working conditions. In the nearly
two decades since NAFTA, workers have faced increasing competition not from other
workers but from machines. The jobs that remain are often part time. Currently one of the
biggest issues the farmworkers are fighting for is mandated workers compensation. The
agricultural industry remains exempt despite being a multi-billion dollar a year industry
in New Mexico. 56
The industry has responded to NAFTA and the increased labor disadvantage it
poses by searching for a technological solution. Growers and processors have continually
resisted increasing wages or benefits to workers, instead lobbying for public support of a
technological answer to “save the industry.” The New Mexico Chile Growers Association
website states their position clearly: “automation is the only solution.” If growers could
take advantage of better access to capital, then they could offset the disadvantage of not
having cheap, abundant labor. Capital-intensive technological solutions to the industry‟s
decline have taken the form of mechanization, chemicals, and, most recently, genetic
engineering.

The Technological Solution

Within a decade of NAFTA, the effort to create a technological solution to the labor
problem began to bear some fruit. Industry leaders unveiled new thinning technologies in
55
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2003, and then de-stemmers in 2008. Several types of mechanical harvesters for red chile
have been developed over the past two decades, though the price tag has yet to drop
below six figures.57 The dream of mechanized green chile production has not yet been
realized, and industry leaders are taking other steps to try to stay competitive.
Part of the technological solution has been to increase pesticide use. Pesticides have
been used on chile since the advent of the Green Revolution. Yet pesticide use on chile
remained low compared to other commodity vegetables until the 1990s, when the
notorious pepper weevil appeared throughout southern New Mexican fields. Since then,
pesticide use on chile peppers has risen significantly. While national levels of pesticide
use actually decreased slightly between 2002 and 2007, total acres treated with pesticides
in New Mexico increased 41% and total acres treated with herbicides increased by 62%.58
Despite the increase in pesticide use, chile production has continued to decline in New
Mexico.
The use of pesticides leads to the most controversial technological solution to the
chile industry‟s decline, the genetically engineered chile. The GE chile is a Round-Up
Ready (glyphosate resistant) variety, which means engineers have injected pesticide
resistant genes into the chile genome so that Round-Up can be applied to the plant
without killing it. The industry hopes that the biotech seed variety might succeed where
mechanization, synthetic chemicals, and vertical integration have fallen short and will
turn the industry around. By offering a competitive advantage to those farmers who can
afford the expensive seed and pesticide, the industry hopes to shift production away from
57
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areas like Mexico, whose main advantage is cheap, low-tech labor.
The GE chile is a relatively recent development. Although discussions surrounding
the genetically modified chile in New Mexico go back nearly a decade, there was no fullblown public discourse about the chile until 2008 when state representative Bernadette
Sanchez introduced Senate Bill 60 (SB60) in the New Mexico legislature that explicitly
earmarked funding for GE chile research. In the early 2000s, any industry talk
surrounding GE chile was dismissive. NMSU‟s head breeder, Paul Bosland, for example,
“promised” the Albuquerque Journal in 2001 that no GE chile was being developed.
Bosland took pride in breeding the chile the “old fashioned way,” explaining that “„chile
can‟t be transformed... Labs in Europe, America, and Asia have spent billions of dollars
trying to transform the chile genes.‟”59 Yet a year later NMSU seemed far more willing to
partake in GMO research than Bosland had earlier implied. A 2009 report published by
various NMSU researchers, including Bosland, writes that legislative funding amounting
to $240,000, a reference to HB 324 in 2002, had earmarked 8% of the funds for research
into a Round-Up Ready chile. This is the first explicit mention of the GE chile as a
Round-Up Ready variety.60 According to a NMSU representative statement from a
September 2010 Economic and Rural Development Committee meeting, NMSU will own
the patents to the GE chile.61
On several levels the GE chile represents an ecological expansion driven by a
university-corporate collaboration. On one level, the university patent on the GE chile
59
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merges the university and the industry into a nearly indistinguishable enterprise, where
both gain financially from increased use. On another level, transnational (the ultimate
non-local) seed corporations will profit from a process that potentially restricts local seed
saving through prosecution of any grower whose chile was contaminated with patented
genes through cross-pollination (a near certainty given the nature of cross-pollination and
the impossibility of breeding out genes once they are present). Far from the days when
Fabian Garcia encouraged farmers to improve the NMSU variety through their own field
observations and seed saving abilities, farmers will now rely not only on an extra-local
entity for seeds, but also for the Round-Up pesticide the seeds are bred to withstand
(Syngenta, unsurprisingly, manufactures Round-Up). And finally, the GE chile- bred with
an emphasis on industrial production and not local consumption- will not necessarily be
tasty or healthy to consume.62 The GE chile will be extra-local in ways no chile has yet
been.

The GE Chile Debate and the Local Turn

Various groups have emerged to contest the GE chile. They have argued that it
would perpetuate the harmful, unsustainable farming practices that were partially
responsible for the low yields plaguing New Mexico producers and would further damage
our soil and water systems. Further, they argue, it would threaten farmers‟ livelihoods
through loss of seed and potential lawsuits. A common thread to New Mexican GE chile
opposition has been a post-colonial critique.
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The New Mexico Food & Seed Sovereignty Alliance, consisting of the Traditional
Native American Farmers‟ Association (TNAFA) and the New Mexico Acequia
Association (NMAA), emerged as the first and most outspoken group to contest GM
chile research in New Mexico. The Food and Seed Alliance issued a House Memorial in
2006 that offered a multifaceted critique of GMOs as a threat to the livelihood and
culture of historically marginalized and exploited groups in an ongoing colonization
project by corporate powers. Their proclamation of seed sovereignty described “genetic
modification and the potential contamination of our landraces by GE technology [as] a
continuation of genocide upon indigenous people and as malicious and sacrilegious acts
toward our ancestry, culture, and future generations.”63
Isaura Andaluz, director of Cuatro Puertas, an Albuquerque based group that
spearheaded legislation to protect farmers from GE contamination lawsuits, framed a
post-colonial critique in more squarely economic terms. She admits she is usually
hesitant to bring up colonization, but nonetheless views the issue in such terms. “„Get
over it,‟ I usually think, „but in this case this really is colonization. Its colonization by
corporations... They think we are stupid, dumb. We have no money... But we‟ve done this
work against the GE chile with no money, its very grassroots.” One of her chief concerns
is that only NMSU, Syngenta, and a few local elite processors stand to gain from GE
chile, while the majority of farmers will likely have to pay for a product they don‟t want.
Andaluz summed up the economic colonization of the farmer in New Mexico in a
rhetorical question at the end of our interview. “The most important question people are
starting to ask,” she remarked, “is why are the processors, and not the farmers, being
63
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supported?”64
In 2009 Cuatro Puertas, forwarded the Farmer Protection Act (FPA) with the goal
of protecting farmers who had inadvertently grown seed that had contaminated their
fields. The legislation drove at the issue of whether the state should solidify a
corporation‟s right to control a seed stock or whether to allow the new commodity to
revert back to the commons. The biotech industry heavily lobbied the legislature and the
FPA was shot down in the state Congress in 2009, 2010, and 2011 (renamed the Farmer
Liability Act in 2011).65
The industry has fought back to counter the growing public awareness and hostility
among New Mexicans to the Round-up Ready chile. They began publicizing the
industry‟s flagging production and insinuated that drastic measures (without referring
directly to GE chile) were necessary. They opened a website called “savenmchile.com”
and one major processor launched a “New Mexican Grown” campaign, which
encouraged consumers to only buy chile grown in New Mexico (despite the fact that this
processor sold other products, without the NM grown label, made with Mexican chile).
Thus, the industry both worked with Mexico to compete globally and antagonized
Mexico publicly to compete locally.
Ultimately, the GE chile debate represents a fight over control of a commons. Less
than a century ago, Fabian Garcia urged farmers to be active, diligent seed savers and
improve the seed themselves. The chile‟s gene pool was a commons where every farmer
and gardener could improve the chile to fit their own local climatic conditions and tastes.
With the right to legally prosecute anyone who saves seed from a chile with patented
64

Personal interview with Isaura Andaluz, Oct. 11, 2009.
65

Save New Mexico Seeds, savenmseeds.org.

43
genes, however, this immense public, local, and long taken for granted commons, has
been privatized by an extra-local transnational corporation.
The history of the New Mexican industrial chile pepper is full of such ecological
shifts. Often, these shifts have expanded the ecology from local, diversified power
centers towards consolidated, extra local ones. The roots of these shifts go back well
before the industry took off, when Dr. Fabian Garcia issued a chile variety that he
believed would, with the help of various individual farmers selecting and saving seed,
help chile growers scale up and appeal to a national market. Despite his earnest efforts to
disseminate his research to a wide swath of growers- large and small, north and south- the
export-based industry to come required a scale that only larger growers, primarily in the
south, could successfully engage in. By the 1970s, the pepper had become a mild,
uniform, and high-tech commodity that would no longer be grown primarily by small
scale New Mexican farmers mainly for New Mexicans.
In the years after NAFTA, when the industry began to face decline and increasing
global competition, the chile‟s ecology both expanded into new realms of corporate
control, but also contracted. As large producers vertically integrated moved their
operations across national borders, jobs for Mexican workers in New Mexican chile
fields became scarcer, and smaller New Mexican growers were outcompeted by larger
ones. All the while, industrial monocultures and the new potential for lawsuits to
discourage seed saving have decreased, and threaten to further decrease, biodiversity in
New Mexican chile fields. A public-private collaboration between NMSU and private
corporations- from Old El Paso to Syngenta- has driven this change. This collaboration
has shifted the emphasis of university research away from the empowerment and benefit
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of local growers, consumers, and small businesses, towards increasing markets across the
globe for the profit of a smaller set of elite New Mexican growers and processors, and
corporations based far beyond any local watershed.

Epilogue
Around a decade ago, growers and NMSU researchers began to notice that the taste
of the industry‟s chile just wasn‟t what it used to be. In 2002, NMSU scientists obtained
original seed stock, stored in liquid nitrogen, at the U.S. Department of Agriculture‟s
National Seed Storage Lab in Fort Collins, Co. By 2008, the researchers had developed a
chile from that stock that they felt carried the original flavor of the 6-4 and NuMex Big
Jim, and released them as the “Heritage NuMex Big Jim,” and the “Heritage 6-4.”
The decline of taste in the 6-4 and NuMex Big Jim indicates the extent to which
many farmers over the years have either selected only for yield or disease resistance, for
example, or did not select at all and simply saved seed from their crop indiscriminately.
Head breeder at NMSU, Paul Bosland, recently remarked, "Over the years [the chiles]
lost their identity. They're not true to type anymore,” he said, “The chile the farmers were
growing had a great look and disease resistance, but no taste.” 66 Just as the seed “lost its
identity” over the years, the chile growers have, to some extent, lost their place as seed
breeders in the industrial chile‟s ecology. To get that great taste these days, the research
scientists pull it out of liquid nitrogen storage, do the seed trials and breeding themselves,
and distribute it to the growers.
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In the history of New Mexico‟s industrial chile, the shift away from local control
has often mirrored a diminished role of New Mexican growers to select and save seed.
Whereas Fabian Garcia encouraged, even relied on seed savers, the industrial varieties
that followed did not. While some varieties, such as the NuMex Big Jim, whose
namesake, Jim Lytle, was a large grower who also helped select for and breed this
variety, the overall trend led towards a small group of scientific experts to take over the
role of seed selection and breeding.67 Never has that been more evident than with the GE
chile.
A recent trip I took to a farmer in Monticello, NM illustrates a counter narrative.
Joshua Craven, seed saver and director of the Arid Crop Seed Cache, represents one of
many possible examples of alternative growers in New Mexico today. 68 Joshua and his
wife, Lolynn, live in Monticello where they grow many of the rare and drought-tolerant
seeds for the cache at their farm.

Padilla, Chile Chronicles, 79.
In the midst of my research, I found alternative, counter narratives enmeshed within the dominant story
of the chile‟s expanding ecology. From the Smith-Lever Act to the current legislative debates concerning
the GE chile and the Farmer Liability Act here in New Mexico, the dominant trend has been resisted to
varying degrees over the past century.
One particularly noteworthy countertrend is NMSU‟s sustainable agriculture wing at their Alcalde
Research Station. Founded in 1952 to address agricultural conditions particular to the agricultural valleys of
northern New Mexico (there are eight research stations across the state, the first established near Aztec,
NM in the late 19th century, designed to address the various climatic differences of New Mexico), the
Alcalde station has in recent years become a center for sustainable agriculture in the state. NMSU has plans
to create a similar branch location with a small farming focus in the middle Rio Grande Valley, as well.
While the allocation of funds diverted to such projects pales to those going to agribusiness research, the
sustainable agriculture wing of NMSU nonetheless testifies to an alternative- though hardly dominanttrend that has emerged recent decades at NMSU.
The growth of the organic farming movement in recent decades has no doubt driven this alternative
trend at NMSU. Organic agriculture, which directly opposes the use of any genetically engineered crop, has
taken hold on small farms (and some large ones) throughout New Mexico. Between 2006 and 2008, the
number of certified acres in organic production jumped nearly six fold. This trend has developed despite
the bulk of NMSU‟s research going towards conventional agribusiness and industrial farming methods.
Thus, farmers have exhibited a degree of agency and independence from the dominant agenda of the landgrant university.
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I drove thirty miles northwest from Truth or Consequences, through vast desert,
until the tiny town of Monticello appeared like a mirage. Its historic plaza was in a
morning nap and the church, post office, and tidy, unoccupied second homes were as
quiet as the surrounding mesas. And just as quickly I had entered town, I had already
passed it. Skinny cows lined the road as asphalt became dirt. Dust flew up in my rearview
as I bumped towards the seed farm that, as far as I could tell, lay on the edge of
civilization.
The first thing I noticed when I stepped out of my truck were the trees. Apples,
pomegranates, and peaches basked in the sun near the Craven‟s house. A dry breeze
swept across the panoramic desert beyond. I heard the screen door slam. Joshua appeared
in khaki pants and an old tee shirt; his long blond hair braided into a pony tail. He
approached me with a welcoming smile. I remarked on the trees and he explained that he
used the gray water from his house to irrigate them. He pointed to trees at the base of a
mesa where he irrigates from run-off after big rains. He then looked down a steep slope
to a green canopy of leaves. Most of his trees were down below, in the four acre food
forest he had begun to convert from an abandoned peach orchard ten years ago.
We walked down the rocky slope. Along the way a dead sapling stood in the center
of a pile of stones designed to help catch water. “Sometimes the experiments don‟t
work,” he said with a sad shrug. With only four inches of rain, it has been a hard year for
a new tree depending solely on irrigation from run-off rain. I walked down the rest of the
slope with a fresh reminder of the thin line that water can draw between life and death.
As we descended into the shade of the garden, the tangy smell of ripe and rotting
apples immediately filled my nostrils. Distant bee buzzes and the light chatter of leaves in
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the autumn breeze were the only sounds beside our footsteps. Above us was cloudless
sky; below us dark, irrigated mud stuck to our boots as we walked.
Fruit trees grew in all directions. Saplings grew in untidy clumps near the base of
their parent tree. Ubiquitous weed cover painted the floor shades of brown and green.
From one vantage point, Joshua pointed out apples, pears, peaches, apricots,
pomegranates, jujubes, quince, plums, walnuts, pistachios, pecans, elderberry, raspberry,
grapes, and blackberry. It seemed if he had squinted a little harder he would have seen
even more. There were often many different varieties within nearly every species of tree.
In the south end of the field, for instance, grew a softball size peach that splits upon
ripening (“terrible for market,” Joshua explained, “but unbelievably delicious”) and on
the west end grew a rare, ancient relative of the apple, native to Kazakhstan.
We walked through the shade toward his small vegetable plot, where crops and
weeds intermingled in nearly half an acre of semi-straight rows. Joshua stresses his crops
through weed competition and lack of water, or “intentional neglect,” as he calls it. “I
want to wean out the strongest, most drought tolerant trees and vegetables,” he explained,
“plus, when the weeds become too much I can pull them and use them as mulch.” He
pulled an amaranth plant and placed it between two lettuce plants as a demonstration.
Joshua grows over twenty types of vegetables, including the chile. He plants
enough of every species to get a diverse genetic sample. He only takes seeds from the
ones that thrive in the hard conditions. If he sees curly top virus on a tomato plant, for
example, instead of pulling the plant like a well-trained gardener, he will rub the leaves
all over his hands and then rub the other plants. I examined his tomato plants closely.
Some had wilted, faded leaves, but most had a robust green sheen and abundant, healthy
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fruit.
Many of the seeds Joshua grows are from arid regions where plants have been bred
to withstand drought. The tomato plants were from Iraq. Wars and large seed companies
are threatening the loss of old, drought resistant varieties, Joshua explained, just as
climatic changes are making those vanishing varieties most needed. Undoubtedly, his
concerned look derived partly from the GE threat that extends even to his remote garden.
“It is crucial to save these important varieties. They can help save us,” his distant gaze
became focused. He picked up a knife and a recycled yogurt container. He sliced a ripe
tomato and squeezed its seeds into the container, handing me a piece of the remaining
seedless flesh to taste. Its sweet, non-waterlogged flavor rivaled the best tomatoes I have
eaten all year. He grabbed a few more tomatoes. The tour was over; it was lunchtime.
The line between the wild and the cultivated blurs at the Jardin del Alma. Some
plants are difficult to distinguish as cultivars or weeds. As I walked through this
seemingly chaotic garden over the course of a few morning hours, however, the order
within this design came into focus. No plant was coddled and yet the garden was healthy.
Thousands of generations of genetic knowledge had come together through the sheer
degree of biodiversity of these wild, semi-wild, and cultivated plants. The seeds were
strong. This wild looking garden on the edge of civilization is calculated in its simplicity
and carefully crafted to help save the society it seems so far from.
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